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Oh What a Tangled Web We Weave: Metaphor and Mapping in Graphical Interfaces


William W. Gaver
Computer Related Design, Royal College of Art
Kensington Gore, London SW7 2EU, U.K.
gaver@rca-crd.demon.co.uk

© ACM

Abstract

The relations among graphical representations, computer functionality, and everyday objects are more complex than terms like "the desktop metaphor" may suggest. While metaphors in the everyday world highlight similarities between preexisting entities, interface metaphors create new ones. New computer entities can also be created without metaphor, when existing elements are combined by conceptual structuring. Naming such constructs, however, may involve yet another metaphor, between the functionality suggested graphically and that implied by the name. In sum, interface representations - which can only be called "metaphors" metaphorically - are complex and confusing, but this leads to a flexibility and power that may be lost if simpler mappings are used.

Keywords:

mapping, metaphor, semiotics

Introduction

Graphical interfaces are typically thought to be effective because they use metaphors to everyday objects in order to suggest their functionality. The relations among computer functionality, graphical representations, and everyday ob- jects are more varied and complex than this may suggest, however. In this note I discuss some of the issues involved in creating representations of computer functions to show that the "desktop metaphor" is really a complex web of mappings.

METAPHORS IN THE EVERYDAY WORLD

Metaphors are linguistic devices in which the similarities between two things are highlighted by referring to them as equivalent - for example, "I am an island," or "painting the town," or "family tree" (top of Figure 1).

Metaphors typically compare things that have preexisting identities, both conceptually and in appearance. Thus they are easier to create linguistically than graphically. However, graphical metaphors can be created, for example by combining the appearances of the two concepts to be compared (e.g., the graphical "family tree" at the bottom of Figure 1). The ability to do this without changing the sense of the metaphor suggests that two different mappings are relevant. The metaphor itself is a conceptual mapping between the two ideas, while independent perceptual mappings relate each of the ideas to its representation as a word or picture [2]. Though in most cases metaphors create new concepts only temporarily, for the duration of a sentence, occasionally new entities such as family trees are created that take on an existence of their own.

FIGURE 1. Metaphors are conceptual mappings independent from the perceptual mappings used to express them.

METAPHORS IN COMPUTATIONAL WORLDS

Metaphors work differently in computer interfaces than in the everyday world. Whereas linguistic metaphors usually highlight similarities between existing entities, interface metaphors like "buttons" or "windows" serve to define new ones.

Two classes of attributes can be distinguished for everyday and computational entities [1]: appearance (e.g., "round, appears to afford pressing") and functional (e.g., "performs some task when activated"). In the everyday world, the relation between appearance and functional attributes is often very close because objects' physical structures are lawfully related to their perceptual appearance. For computer entities, in contrast, the relation between their appearance and underlying functionality is almost entirely arbitrary and must be designed.


FIGURE 2: Metaphors can fuse form and function.

After all, graphical displays (such as icons) have perceptual attributes but no functional ones. Computer entities have functional attributes but no perceptual ones. Interface metaphors allow the relations between functional and appearance attributes to be created for interface objects by a conceptual mapping between the functional attributes of the computer and an everyday analog (Figure 2). By designing a display's perceptual attributes to be similar to those of an everyday analog, the display can simultaneously suggest a conceptual mapping between the functional attributes of the software and the everyday analog, and at the same time create the relation between the display's perceptual attributes and the software's functional ones.

The result is that the metaphor acts to fuse the represen- tation and software so that the graphics gains the functional attributes of the software, and the software the appearance attributes of the graphics. The two become one, producing a new sort of graphical entity that, unlike pictures, has functional attributes as well as perceptual ones, affordances as well as appearance.

Moreover, if this process of fusing graphics and software is successful, the role of the metaphor is complete. The com- puter entity no longer needs to be understood via an every- day analog, but instead can be understood directly as an item with functions and appearance. Thus interface objects such as buttons, windows, files and folders exist indepen- dently from their real world counterparts. After fusion, they are no longer metaphors, but objects in their own right.

NOT METAPHOR

Once new interface entities with both appearances and functions have been created using metaphor, they may themselves be joined via conceptual structuring to form more complex constructs. This is not a metaphorical process, but one of building from simple elements. Just as data structures can be defined from lower-level variables, so can interface objects having no analogs in the everyday world be constructed from simpler elements. For instance, tool palettes are created by combining sliding surfaces, icons, and buttons to create new entities with no obvious analogs.

The perceptual mappings between the appearances of com- puter entities and those of their everyday analogs are not metaphorical either. For instance, a conceptual button in the model world may be given perceptible form on the computer display by a picture of a button or by the word "button," neither of which involves a metaphor. Instead, a picture of a file involves an iconic mapping to the concep- tual file, while the word "file" relies on a symbolic one [2]. True graphical metaphors (such as the family tree in Figure 1) are used only rarely for perceptual mappings, and when they are they usually take the form of metonymy, in which parts are used to stand for wholes (e.g., when the letter "A" is used to stand for a text-writing tool in graphics programs).

Finally, when iconic mappings indicate components of an interface structure, it is more appropriate to think about the expression of that structure than a metaphor. From this perspective, graphical indications that a button may be pressed or that menu items may be selected need not depend on metaphors to buttons or menus. Instead they use the same sort of perceptual information about the layout of objects and surfaces that allows affordances to be perceived in the everyday world. At this level, the concept of metaphor applies only loosely and not very usefully.

MIXED METAPHORS: NAMES AND GRAPHICS

The situation becomes more complex still when graphical entities are named. In some cases (e.g., buttons) names and graphics suggest the same functionality. But in others (e.g., windows) the graphical devices used to create them - such as scrollbars, buttons, and the title bar - express different functions than those suggested by the name. Comparing these two sets of implied functions, however, allows the true functionality of software windows to emerge. For instance, scrollbars' graphical suggestion of changing something, and window's suggestion of views as something to be changed, are mutually responsible for expressing an aspect of graphical windows' functions.

From this perspective, names can introduce a second layer of interface metaphor, one between the functionality ex- pressed graphically and that suggested by the name (Figure 3). Metaphors from the everyday world may convey un- wanted implications about functionality (e.g., buttons may not appear movable). Graphical expressions of novel structures (e.g., windows) may not be able to convey all the functionality being offered or to provide it with a unified identity. Using both names and graphics allows two models to both add to and constrain one another.


FIGURE 3. When names suggest different functionality than graphics express, software functions depend on the mix.

CONCLUSION

Calling the sorts of representations created by interface de- signers "metaphors" is itself something of a metaphor. As I hope to have illustrated, the mappings involved are more complex and varied than can be captured so simply. Their complexity should be embraced, however, since it allows a flexibility and power that simpler, easier to conceptualize mappings may lose. For understanding interfaces, it is im- portant that we untangle our metaphorical web. For designing, it is important we do not.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Martin Locker, conversations with whom inspired me to write this paper. I also thank Colin Burns, Gillian Crampton-Smith, and Anne Schlottmann for comments.

References

[1] Familiant & Detweiler (1994). Iconic reference: Evolving perspectives and an organizing framework International Journal of Human-Machine Studies.
[2] Gaver, W. (1989). The SonicFinder: An interface that uses auditory icons. Human-Computer Inter-action 4(1): 67-94.